Germany Is Jeopardizing Transatlantic Relations | Opinion

Several months after the U.S. approved a significant $61 billion Ukraine aid package, bringing total American aid to $175 billion, the German government is putting the brakes on new military aid to Ukraine as part of a plan to cut spending. This freeze is already in effect and will apply to future funding requests, not previously approved aid.

Berlin had previously decided to halve future military assistance to Ukraine, allocating €4 billion to address other pressing budgetary needs. Ukraine may need to rely more heavily on funding from “European sources” moving forward, according to German Finance Minister Christian Lindner.

These developments are but the latest in a longstanding trend: Berlin never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity at genuine leadership. It’s not just Europe that needs Germany to step up; the future of transatlantic relations hinges on whether it can take a defense leadership role in Europe. At stake is the future of the U.S.’ relationship with its allies across the Atlantic as Washington looks to free its resources and pivot into Asia—for real this time.

The moment is grim. Following Ukraine’s unsuccessful counteroffensive last year, Russia began a slow, steady advance further into the country’s territory. In response, Kyiv launched another bold counteroffensive, this time into Russia’s Kursk region, aiming to establish a buffer zone within Russian territory. Ukraine may also aim to force Moscow to reallocate troops, thereby slowing the Russian offensive in the east. So far, Moscow has shown reluctance to pull significant numbers from the eastern front, but that could shift with time. Ukraine now confronts a perilous dilemma: whether to pursue territorial gains in Kursk at the potential cost of compromising its already strained position in Donetsk.

With the Ukraine war raging on its doorstep and now entering a new phase with the Kursk campaign, Germany’s decision to freeze aid to Ukraine is disastrous and short-sighted. It sends the message that Germany doesn’t consider the war to be existential, or it expects the United States to shoulder the entire burden of European defense. Even within Europe, if Berlin cuts aid to Ukraine to address its budgetary needs, how can German Chancellor Olaf Scholz expect to succeed in his pleas for more European support for Ukraine? Ukraine urgently needs “a lot of munitions, artillery, tanks, and air defense, especially the Patriot and Iris-T systems from Germany, which will be most helpful,” Scholz stated earlier this year. “We will support Ukraine as long as it takes,” he promised. Freezing aid contradicts every statement and plea the chancellor has made over the last two years. It would be a self-inflicted wound to Germany’s credibility and raise serious questions about its commitment.

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states are bolstering their military capabilities. Warsaw hopes to build the strongest army in Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron advocates for Europeanizing nuclear deterrence. Europeans stepping up to take care of their own security is always welcome news for Washington, as it ultimately allows the U.S. to pivot its assets to Asia, where the looming Taiwan contingency will shape the future of the Indo-Pacific and the world order for the remainder of the 21st century. However, despite the positive developments in most of Europe, Washington continues to grapple with an enduring German problem—one which is worsening over time and extending beyond the immediate question of Ukraine.

Traditionally, policymakers in Washington and Brussels have viewed Germany’s enduring geopolitical stagnation solely as a risk for Germany. However, as the geopolitical landscape in Europe shifts, marked by Russian aggression and the enormous and unprecedented military buildup in Poland, Germany is jeopardizing not only its own vitality as the self-crowned peace-era economic leader of Europe but also the overall balance of power within the European bloc.

The working theory in Berlin, Brussels, and Washington is that the Transatlantic relationship forged after the defeat of Nazi Germany is almost an inevitable fact of life. The United States, it seems, will always be there to manage European affairs, as Washington has throughout the 20th century’s major wars. But what if this seemingly ironclad Transatlantic relationship is heading towards a major, silent shift? What if the historical and geopolitical connection that once bound Europe and the U.S. is weakening? On top of that, what if the U.S. had to change its military posture as it manages priorities between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, no longer capable of fighting two theater wars simultaneously?

As Transatlantic relations evolve in the 21st century, it is imperative that Berlin play a leading role in European defense affairs. German inaction or strategic stagnation will directly undermine Europe’s overall balance of power and will keep Washington bogged down in Europe.

Pax Americana oversaw concerted efforts to address—or rather suppress—many of the ethnic and national problems that have historically plagued the continent. However, as American power becomes increasingly intertwined with the situation in Asia, particularly in Taiwan, the U.S. and its allies will have to face trade-offs—without a strong German presence in Europe, there is a heightened risk of renewed ethnic and national tensions. The Balkans, the Greece-Turkey standoff in the East Mediterranean, and the possibility of broader conflict with Russia in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states are among the potential threats to European security. Without achieving true military reinvigoration, whether under Scholz’s banner of “Zeitenwende” or not, the absence of German power would be disastrous for Ukraine and Europe—regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November.

Mohammed Soliman is a director at the Middle East Institute, a member of McLarty Associates, and a visiting fellow at Third Way. On X: @ThisIsSoliman

The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.